>> welcome everyone. if could you please find your seats once again so that we can

get on to the next exciting portion of today's arms control association annual meeting. jenny. thank you everyone. all right. hello and welcome back to the second half of the 2024 arms control association annual meeting. to this point, our speakers and panelists have reviewed some of the many reasons why this is a pivotal moment in the long struggle to reduce the threats posed by nuclear weapons. and as we heard from the secretary general in his remarks, the world is on a knife's edge. and he said we need to disarm it now. all countries need to step up, but nuclear weapons states need

to lead the way, he said. here at the arms control association, we would agree that indeed they do. but there are others who need to do some things too. and as an organization based in the united states, with members and friends across the world but we're based in the united states, we along with our partners and friends here including you, i think, have a special responsibility to do all we can to move us back from the brink and back on the right path. our next speaker is going to talk about some of the things that we need to be thinking about as we try to do so. the next speaker is my friend in the arms control association's board chair, tom countryman. he's going to offer his thoughts on his behalf and i think they reflect those of the board and the association's members on what we need to do now to respond to that moment.

so tom, if you could come up. tom has sort of -- on the board since 2017. he's provided a jolt of energy and a lifetime of experience as a diplomat, a communicator, and practitioner to a.c.a.'s work. so thank you tom. we look forward to your comments and the floor is yours. [applause] mr. countryman: before i begin my comments, i think this is the only moment in the program where we have a chance to speak on behalf of hundreds here and thousands more and in fact millions to express our appreciation and our admiration for darrell kimball's dedicat leadership of this organization. thank you, darrell.

[applause] now, for a number of reasons many of which have already been discussed today, this is a difficult, dangerous pivotal moment in the long journey to the dangers posed by nuclear weapons. so what kind of a talk can i give you today? well, this is not a graveside eulogy. reports of the death of arms control are greatly and deliberately exaggerated. this is not a religious service where the pastor tells the faithful in gory detail what awaits the sinners who are not in church today. it's also not a cable news show where pundits bemoan the parlous state of the world or of an

election and ask plentiively won't somebody -- maintenancively won't somebody do something? i think it's a little more like a football coach's locker room pep talk, fine tuning the game plan for the second half. so today, i'll offer some thoughts not just on what we want from the possessors of nuclear weapons what they must do, but also what this community and others need to do to effect a change in direction. the moment is dangerous not because world governments have forgotten the risk of nuclear war but because too many world leaders no longer see it as the overriding existential risk. after the cuban crisis of 1962, two superpowers recognized that if nuclear destruction were not averted, no other national goals

mattered. it's different today. at least moscow views the risk of nuclear war as secondary to the risk of failing in its goal of territorial expansion. and this drives reactive decisions in other capitals. as secretary general gutierrez noted in his remarks the primary responsibility for addressing nuclear risk continues to lie with the owners of the two supersized arsenals, the united states and the russian federation. the refusal of russia to engage in any kind of bilateral discussion is not just irresponsible. it's a history in which arms control dialogue continued, even at times when one side's weapons were killing the other side's soldiers, in vietnam or in afghanistan.

just as unfortunately in response to moscow's refusal some officials in this city shrugged their shoulders and said we tried arms control. now let's rebuild our arsenal. that ignores a central lesson of the 50 years in which arms control negotiations improved america's national security. that lesson is that the indispensable ingredient is american creativity, american persistence, american leadership leadership. note that leadership does not lead american dominance or control of a process. it simply means tireless determination. it means refusing to take no as the final answer.

as pavel ludvic writes in arms control today there exists both a consensual basis and an historical basis for washington and moscow to reach a successor agreement to new start that addresses both state's national security interests. as he notes, the political change that would make negotiation possible may seem distant today but it may be closer than it appears. that that still exists a place where russian and american officials speak to each other on nuclear issues, the p-5 process. at a moment when bilateral dialogue is not possible, the p- p-5 dialogue should assume greater importance. in a private dialogue, new ideas, new steps small or large

can be explored without the posturing and the point scoring that marks the public debate in geneva or new york or vienna. china will soon assume for one year the chairmanship of this process. recall that last year, presidents biden and gi agreed that proliferation was one topic on which two sides need to cooperate. it is my deep home that china will show some ambition equal to the importance that it claims in world affairs that it will increase the frequency of p-5 meetings elevate their level and expand their agenda. they don't need to focus on reaching consensus among the five on every issue. they do need to focus on listening and on mutual

understanding. as i noted, the primary responsibility for progress lies with washington and moscow. france and china and the united kingdom are not off the hook, however. they do not have the option of sitting on the sideline waiting for the u.s. and russia. they must recognize and respond to the overwhelming view of non-weapon states that the p-5 are failing to meet and even consciously ignoring their obligations under the non-proliferation treaty. let me say a little bit about what we should expect and demand from the non-nuclear weapon states. i'm impressed by the way that the non-weapons states parties to the n.p.t. have stepped up in recent years. they correctly concluded that

arms control initiatives are urgently needed, so urgently that the initiative should not rest only with the p-5. one result was the treaty on the prohibition of nuclear weapons,ed a admirable if imperfect document. non-weapon states need now to step up higher if we are to preserve the essential norms of global security. as the late michael crapon described them, these are the norms against use or threats of use, against nuclear testing and against the transfer and proliferation of nuclear weapons. so let's be specific. when president putin and his being a lights -- acolytes make nuclear threats there is no audible pushback in the non-nuclear world, only a deafening silence. saying out loud that such

threats whether subtle or explicit are unacceptable to the international community, that's not taking sides over the war in ukraine. it's simply living up to the principles that non-nuclear states proclaim in the sound proof chambers in geneva and new york. mr. putin does not expect anyone to endorse his methods. but because he does not hear anyone outside of nato criticizing his threatening words, he will continue to speak them. let's be more specific. the level of the speaker matters. when i was an assistant secretary of state, i took the statements of my counterparts to represent accurately the positions of their governments. but presidents and prime ministers do not listen to their

own assistant secretaries and assistant ministers as closely as they listen to other presidents and prime ministers. if arms control concerns are not conveyed at a higher level, directly to the leaders of the p-5 states, t leaders will conclude, correctly perhaps that nuclear issues are of lower importance to the rest of the not the only leader who needs to hear directly from other world leaders. but his is the right address to begin. non-weapons states have a duty to preserve the non-proliferation pillar of the n.p.t. at a moment when several states speak openly about leaving the treaty or developing their own nuclear arsenal, non-weapon states need to speak with one voice.

they should declare jointly and publicly that any such move would make it impossible to continue normal political and economic relations with a new weapons-possessing state. so all of these are ideas that we have to the world's governments. and since we are here in washington, we need to start with the united states government. our public statements need to support the white house when it says or does the right thing. and the best example was the statement jake sullivan made right here one year ago when he said the nuclear arsenal was sufficient for deterrence for the foreseeable future and declared that the u.s. wanted bilateral dialogue with russia without pre-conditions. sadly, at least a few people in government seemed to believe that mr. sullivan's offer has been overtaken by

events and is now no longer relevant. at the same time, we have to be vocal about backward steps and persistent in convincing this government and others that there are alternatives to a new nuclear arms race. our work to reduce and to eliminate the threat of nuclear weapons must be informed by the catastrophic humanitarian impacts of nuclear war. but our dialogue with policymakers must also recognize the validity of genuine national securityon more obvious by threatening rhetoric from nuclear-possessing states. we can critique the flaws in deterrence theory and postures, but we can't simply dismiss deterrence as a concept without offering realistic alternatives

sufficient to provide security. now, the arms control association, this tiny but mighty team, with great analytic contributions from so many of you in this room, has worked to analyze and address the questions that should be discussed among governments. can our national better protected by concepts of sufficiency rather than symmetry symmetry? are we tied to ratified treaties as the best new form of -- as the best form of agreements? or can we find new forms which sometimes means old forms of bilateral and multilateral agreements, focusing as much on behavior and on transparency as they do on numbers? how do we achieve the goal that presidents xi and biden agreed to pursue, maintaining human

control of nuclear decisions? it's also important as we push back against those who argue that arms control is dead or dying, that we do one thing better than government spokesmen or dip mats. we have to speak with an air of civilitiy even when those who disagree with us are con descending or insulting. as in diplomacy, anyone in or out of government who is trying to solve the same vexing issues should be seen as a potential partner, not an eternal adversary. our target audience is broad perhaps mobile broad for the size -- impossibly broad for the size of our community. in washington as in other countries it comprises political and military leadership and

workers, thousands of dedicated specsists as well as the congress. we need new ways to appeal to public opinion and to mobilize public engagement. and that door is more open at this moment when more citizens are aware of the nuclear risk than at any time in the last 40 or perhaps 60 years. we can't avoid the awareness that elections matter. since the 1950's, every u.s. president except one has acknowledged that arms control is national security. that it can be win-win not zero sum. that's speaking to an adversary is a sign of confidence, notf weakness.

that insisting on absolute american sovereignty or american dominance in arsenals is a recipe for tragic conflict. the results here on november 5 will affect the strategy of our efforts but not their urgency. in particular, we to younger people, the generation from which i draw my daily dose of optimism. are we doing enough to raise their consciousness to equip them with the concepts and analytic tools to address the dilemmas that my generation is leaving to them? now, i was pulled kicking and screaming into the 21st century and i sure don't know how to get meaningful news and analysis from tiktok or other social media. but millions of young people do.

and we have to meet them as bill henigan said where they are, where they read, where they watch, where they think. in one way, i'm nostalgic for the 1980's when millions of people in the u.s. and abroad mobilized in support of saner nuclear policy and arms control diplomacy to halt and reverse the arms race. their activism convinced national leaders that sensible national security pays political dividends. we live in a different time that requires and strategies. i am heartened, but i confess also envious when i see millions of people, primarily young people demanding responsible action on climate change, the

other e. extension threat that we face -- the other e. extension threat that we face. i want to recommend an article in "arms control today" in november by ambassador kenneth brill. he notes there should be, there must be a common cause climate change activists demanding a secure and prosperous future and nuclear activists who are simply demanding a future. it's a long list of tasks. and it can be discouraging. setbacks have been frequent and advances have been only at the margins. the issues are many. and our numbers are not. as fishermen traditionally prayed the sea is so wide, lord, and my boat is so small. the total annual budget for all

the organizations working in this field in the u.s. andelsewhere is less than governments spend on nuclear weapon in half a day. but as john kennedy said about going to the moon, we choose to do this not because it is easy because it is hard. because the goal organize and measure the best of our energies and skills, because the challenge is one that we are unwilling to postpone. i still believe despite all evidence to the contrary that humans are better at solving problems than at creating problems. in september of 1962, nobody predicted that within a few months, moscow and washington initiate decades of world changing negotiations

making both nations safer. today we both need to work to prevent the breakdown moment when the guardrails against nuclear catastrophe evaporate and be prepared to seize a breakthrough moment where we can advance again in the security of a world free of nuclear weapons. your contributions now whether in time, money, analysis or activism will be crucial as we head toward that moment. now i realize that this was more like a church sermon than a locker room peptalk. i can tell because i see a couple people dozing off. i want to simply thank you today for your attention and above all

, thank you tomorrow for your commitment. god bless. [applause] >> well tom, i'm ready to jump into the football field or the soccer pitch with a new plan and work even harder. >> see you in church. >> mixed metaphors abound here. we have a couple questions. how do we successfully dropped russia and china into the nuclear risk reduction dialogue? what helps? what's not so help? the microphone is here. -- what's not so helpful? microphone is up here. >> it's not easy. part of it is persistence.

i really was not impressed, i'm sad to say, by the way that the u.s. government followed up mr. sullivan's speech here by year ago. it's as if there is offer on the table, call us back when you pick it up. i think that it requires -- you've got to knock on the door more than once if you want to the skeptical householder to answer and i don't think we've done enough of that as a government. i do think in the numerous track two's that aca and others are pursuing with china, we can at least demonstrate indirectly to those governments that there is a real agenda. it's not a trap. it's not an effort to undermine

your other goals. it's not an effort to subvert our cooperation or our competition in other areas. and i think they only hear that if we say it on a nearly daily basis. i do detect resistance within this government, certainly within the congress, to continue to try on that same point. dialogue without preconditions. and that concerns me that the degree of commitment does not match the explicit statement that mr. sullivan made. >> thanks. here's a related question. you recall the p5 statement in january 2022 on the eve of the russian invasion, reaffirming the reagan-gorbachev line.

that's an example of what the p5 can do. how could they given where things are built on that especially with china taking control of chairmanship later this year? what advice would you be whispering into chinese colleagues hears about this? >> i already whispered it with a megaphone on another occasion. let's talk about that statement from january of 2022. we realize that the g reagan and gorbachev saying that one sentence together was that above all, it was one sentence. when the p5 sat down to negotiate a very worthwhile initiative to repeat it coming from the lips of five presidents and prime ministers, you know diplomats. they could not keep it to one sentence.

all five had suggestions for how to explain what we meant by that one sentence. and that's why the one sentence morphed into war than a page. it was still a valuable statement. it should be repeated. i don't have expectations that the p5 can make a better statement than that before the review conference in 2026. but i do expect that they can do a couple of things. number one, find other smaller areas where they have agreed to work together. right now formally the only issue they are committed to discussing his methods of nuclear risk reduction. very valuable, but only one of a very wide range of issues that they could be discussing.

secondly, a lot of the nonnuclear world takes some comfort in the fact that the p5 continue to talk to each other. not at the same high level as we did for many years, and only intermittently and only on one topic, but it matters to the rest of the world. and if we are able not to open up what should closed dialogues but to at least say to the rest of the world, we are talking more frequently, we are talking at a more senior level and we are addressing more topics than before. that in itself creates a better atmosphere for the review conference in two years and a better opening for dialogue between nuclear and non-layer states. -- nonnuclear states. >> thanksrational comments. it's a pleasure to work with you

and all of my team. that's all the time i have for tom. we will take a two minute shift. don't go away. please join me in thanking tom for his service ship. [applause] and if i could ask second panel to join us here on stage. just get them settled. the foreign affairs correspondent editor for reuters will moderate this a on preventing further proliferation in the middle east. -- this panel on preventing further proliferation in the middle east.

>> over to you. >> thank you. i'm arshad muhammad, a reporter with reuters. pleased to moderate this discussion on further proliferation in the middle east. we have an excellent panel. to my left is kelsey davenport, director of nonproliferation policy at the arms control association. next to her is professor of international affairs at george washington university's elliotts coil -- elliott school. next to her is a senior fellow at the center for international policy and the host of the iran podcast. we will make some very brief introductory remarks and then we will start in on the discussion among the four of us and you points

that i fear are very well-known to the people in this room. first, nuclear proliferation has been an issue in the middle east for decades. with one presumed nuclear power israel, iran currently at threshold status in the sense of having the capability to produce fissile material in very short order and saudi arabia clearly seeking to keep its nuclear weapons options open. since the trump administration pulled out of the iran nuclear deal and reimposed u.s. sanctions, iran after waiting for about a year began curtailing its compliance with that agreement, the joint comprehensive plan of action

and has steadily increased its capability to produce bomb grade nuclear material and although it has not actually done, and it has steadily reduced to the international atomic energy agency's access to its facilities. third, regional tensions have increased thomas -- hamas's october 7 attack on israel and israel'st military operation in gaza. and it's worth noting that israel's april 1 unacknowledged but i think undisputed attack on the iranian embassy complex in damascus and iran's unprecedented until then decision to attack israel from iranian soil.

that was a first. and then finally as i bet you all are very well aware the united states and saudi arabia are discussing what might be termed a megadeal, one in which there would be potentially a u.s.-saudi civil nuclear deal. there would be some form of u.s. security guarantee to the kingdom. there would be some pathway to palestinian state. and there would be in theory normalization of relations between israel and saudi arabia. biden administration is exploring that civil nuclear agreement despite the fact that saudi arabia is of course a massive oil producer and has obvious immediate need for new power. and despite the saudi crown prince's position that if iran

developed a nuclear weapon saudi arabia would have to, too. >> thank you also much for being here and thank you for agreeing to moderate. if you weren't moderating, i probably would be. i have theos -- much easier job of telling you what i think. i also want to thank -- for joining us on very short notice. >> my pleasure. >> those of you who know my work at the arms control association will not be surprised that i'm going to focus my remarks on iran's nuclear program. but first just to look at iran's nuclear advances, we really need to recognize that iran's nuclear program is in a fundamentally

different place than it was in the lead up to negotiations on the jcpoa. because the advances that iran has made since the deal was finalized to have really brought iran to the threshold of nuclear weapons and much of thefully reversed even if we are able to reengage iran diplomatically and reach an agreement that limits its nuclear program. in particular i would highlight two areas where iran has clearly invested a lot of time and energy in recent years. it has mastered enrichment up to 60% which is a level that technically can be used for nuclear weapons. it isn't considered weapons grade but it's pretty close. similarly iran has invested a lot of money in its advanced centrifuge capabilities. this allows iran to enrich uranium much more quickly than it could in the past 10 and it means that if iran ever needed to reconstitute its nuclear program, it could build its capacities up much more quickly

by focusing on developing and operating just these more efficient centrifuge machines that were stringently limited under the jcpoa but now that iran is employing and operating en masse. this has fundamentally changed the nature of iran's nuclear program. there are three significant applications these developments have on proliferation risk. first, iran is now much closer to weapons grade uranium than it ever has been in its history. this is a time that we frequently refer to as breakout. and that breakout timeframe for the first weapon is about one week. the breakout timeline for five or six nuclear weapons is about a month. that's really quite crucial because we are getting into these time frames where there's a real risk that iran could try to produce weaponsramaterial for a bomb between iaea inspections.

or more quickly complete the process up to 90% in that parallel program. the other aspect of proliferation risk i would highlight is that because of these advances that iran has made, it can now reconstitute its nuclear program much more quickly. so while i personally do not believe there is a viable military option to addressing the iranian nuclear risk, as we heard, force does remain on the table for the united states. but even if we did resort to force, iran could reconstitute its capabilities relying on these advanced machines. it would not need to build up the same size of infrastructure to oppose again a risk from a proliferation perspective. it is another significant difference that changes proliferation risk.

the third is iran's advances have opened up new pathways to nuclear weapons if the decision were ever made to do so. i would say the sneak out risk, trying to use undeclared facilities is more viable given the advancements and the shortened time frame. how iran would proceed in enriching to weapons grade levels, it has different options now. all of this changes our overarching understanding of iran's nuclear program and the risk it poses. unfortunately, these advances cannot be fully reversed. a deal that rolls back stockpiles or centrifuges could mitigate the risk posed by these developments, but we are looking at a future where even if we have a nuclear agreement with tehran, it is likely to be closer to a bomb then in the past from a technical perspective.

unfortunately layered on top of this is the increased risk posed by the lack of monitoring and access. which iran has limited over the last several years. currently around still is implementing its comprehensive safeguard agreement so inspectors are regularly in facilities where around is enriching uranium. as we know from past experiences, this comprehensive safeguard agreement is insufficient to defend against determined proliferators. right now the iaea does not have access to key facilities like the workshop iran is making centrifuges, concentrating and producing uranium or concentrate. the iaea does what inventory in these areas looks like. the iaea cannot say where all of iran's centrifuges are.

so this just increases the risk or the speculation of risk that iran may be diverting materials to some type of illicit program that it could use later as it makes the decision to pursue nuclear weapons or to retain that covert capacity. the other risk amplified by this lack of monitoring has that the longer these gaps persist, the more challenging it's going to be for the agency to try to reconstitute the history of iran's nuclear program which could be very beneficial and necessary if we do get to the point where we negotiate a new nuclear deal with iran. if the iaea cannot say with reliability how many centrifuges iran has, it's very challenging to verify future limits that might be imposed in a future deal. that has implications for the sustainability of a deal, for

effectively verifying limits and also the u.s. domestic context. the president has to certify that the iaea can verify any future agreement with iran. so these monitoring gaps pose a risk in the long-term and short-term when we talk about being able to ensure that we could quickly detect breakout and in the long term trying to understand these gaps and reconstituted history of iran's nuclear program. that brings me to what we can do about it. i am still an optimist that there is time, space and interest in tehran. we need to acknowledge up front that the 2015 nuclear deal is dead. as a big supporter of the deal,

it pains me to say that. iran's program technically has advanced to the point where the jcpoa would be less effective nonproliferation standpoint it politically the deal is very toxic in both washington and tehran. if we look at time frames going forward, reconstituting it really isn't an option given the political realities we face with the u.s. election but also some of the time frames and expiration dates. if we move past the jcpoa, what does that leave us with. given the short timeframe between now and the u.s. election i think strategy should be focused on reciprocal actions that more immediately de-escalate risk. the u.s. should be looking at ways to incentivize iran to allow inspectors back into some

of these facilities like the centrifuge workshops where the uranium or concentrate is produced. rebuild those gaps. this would be useful in deterring any diversion going forward preventing iran from trying to move materials to a covert program. monitoring should be the number one priority. in return, the u.s. should put something tangible on the table for a run in exchange for these options. that could be unfreezing more iranian assets and transferring them to qatar. something that demonstrates to iran that there are still tangible realizable benefits for engaging diplomatically with the united states. ideally this type of de-escalate or package could bide time and

space for the comprehensive negotiation we are going to need to begin immediately after the u.s. presidential election. i'm happy to talk more about this in the question and answer, but i think the u.s. is going to have to approach these negotiations with a new framework in mind. i think the jcpoa demonstrated that there are challenges to this transactional approach to nonproliferation. not only does the u.s. face a credibility deficit, but we know better understand that there are significant challenges to actually realizing sanctions relief. ensuring a country benefits once the sanctions are lifted is more difficult. maybe we shouldn't even just be looking at iran. maybe this is multiple agreements that includes countries in the region that try to capture some of the

challenges we are facing and other spaces like saudi arabia. i will turn it over to the next speaker. >> actually i didn't prepare opening remarks. bear with me. let's start with what we know, which is not a whole terrible amount. we have been negotiating with the kingdom of saudi arabia for 15 years on the nuclear cooperation agreement. this is kind of a long time. in other cases perhaps with japan or south korea at various times, it has taken a few years but not 15 years. and why is that. first in the early years, saudi arabia was very hesitant to do certain things that we wanted them to do in a nuclear cooperation agreement.

the additional protocol. they had a small quantities protocol. sorry for getting into all the technical stuff. but this latest round of negotiations with saudi arabia has gotten tangled up in this strategic deal. i see this as another chapter in some not very succes by the u.s. to dangle nuclear energy for strategic purposes. i would call this a special deal for a special ally. only in the case of saudi arabia, what a special ally. we know that our special nuclear deal with india at least so far and it's been at least 15 years has perhaps not yielded what we

wanted from that. we still don't have nuclear contracts with india but maybe they are a little amenable to pressure when it comes to china. but in the case of saudi arabia, there is an odd precedent and i wrote about this in the december 2023 edition of arms control today. i was surprised when i started researching it. the precedent was egypt and the camp david accords. i almost get the sense that the u.s. government sort of craft of thisinput from the nonproliferation community. the camp david accords paved the way for a peace treaty between egypt and israel which has been quite successful for the most part. and as a result of that, we signed what we call it a 123 agreement section 123 of the

atomic energy act, with egypt. egypt at the time did not have any nuclear assets or very few. egypt wanted to reprocess spent fuel. we have had a long-standing decades long-standing policy against the spread of both reprocessing technology and enrichment technology, two that have dual uses, very sensitive. egypt was also interested in nuclear cooperation with russia at the time. what we did in the nuclear cooperation agreement was to get the egyptians to say no, we won't reprocess. on our soil. this is actually the origin of what has come to be known as the gold standard. what you don't often hear and

see in the press is that the gold standard begin as a regional policy from the u.s. we didn't want in particular to spread enrichment and reprocessing technologies in the middle east. so our 2009 agreement was the uae, which has often held up as the gold standard, that wasn't the beginning. why is this important? because those agreements -- now our agreement with egypt has i wonder why. they are now in the arms of russia's nuclear technology. those agreements in the middle east all have a clause that is basically a no undercut clause. it says if another party in the region, if you conduct an

agreement with another party in the region that provides other capabilities, you kind of have the right to renegotiate. this is a problem. we don't have a lot of agreements with countries in the middle east. we have one with the uae and we have one with turkey. so if the press reports are correct that one of the benefits we are dangling in front of the saudi's is the uranium enrichment capability and we don't know the contours of that. is it a u.s. built and operated facility, is there some kind of black box technology but keeps the saudi's from getting access to to sensitive information. -- tgooo sensitive information.

critics we are now at a point where the united states is -- the possibility of uranium facility for saudi arabia. >> if that is the case, this will overturn not just one but two policies. what is -- one is we don't want enrichment technology to spread to additional countries. and goodness knows we have spent a lot of effort and the policy community over the years trying to enforce that the second one is this regional policy to maintain the equal terms and conditions for nuclear cooperation in the middle east. so that's the first problem with this approach. the second problem is that it raises risks from other countries. what would iran's reaction be? and i endorse your notion of

perhaps coming up with a regional solution. what about south korea? we are almost in a double bind with south korea because of the august deal. and they have been pressuring us and so far we have would say staved off the request both in the nuclear cooperation agreements but also in other bilateral arrangements. but the pressure could certainly grow from south korea and that raises to get either a similar deal as saudi arabia, or maybe they decide to go it alone. are there constraints against this? yes. how good are those constraints? the nuclear suppliers group says if an agreement includes the spread of enrichment to a new

country that the country has to have an additional protocol. south korea has an additional protocol. my guess is that saudi arabia will also have an additional protocol as part of this arrangement. is that good? absolutely. is that enough? no. i almost want to take a poll of those of you in the audience. did you feel better with the jcpoa in effect with iran's enrichment? >> let's do that actually. >> raise your hand. did you feel better when the jcpoa was in effect? yes. and why is that? because the nonproliferation treaty does not prohibit enrichment or reprocessing. but it is enforced through all of these bilateral nuclear cooperation agreements enforced through working with our allies in the nuclear's pliers group and we also try to get our allies, south korea is a good one because they have been very

good on this in terms of putting such restrictions in their nuclear cooperation agreements. you could even get more creative and say what other countries might be interested? poland? australia? in any event, i think i will stop there. i have a host of things i would like to recommend both in the cooperation agreement. i see a lot of problems. many of you know i worked for the congressional research service for a while and analyzed this for a living. but there are definite weaknesses in the atomic energy act that i think we could clog. the question is how urgent to members of congress or the administration see this. i will say one last thing.

for 15 years we have been negotiating with the saudi's on this and for 11 years, they have insisted they would get the same capabilities that iran has.and so we really need to ask the question and this is why i feel like the nonproliferation community has not been really cold -- polled on all of this. should you be sharing enrichment technology in any shape or with a country that has openly said it would acquire nuclear weapons capabilities in a specific scenario which doesn't look that far off actually in the middle east. >> thanks so much. let me also thank -- who stepped into the breach at the last moment because one of our panelists was ill. i would like to ask you two questions. why didn't israel's attack on the iranian embassy complex in

damascus and then the subsequent direct iranian retaliation, why didn't that erect into a wider conflagration? question two, do you think that exchange has changed the balance of power or changed iranian strategic thinking and made it any more or less likely that they someday might choose to pursue nuclear weapons? >> thank you, great to be here filling in for my colleagues. ck to this discussion. i think that episode although it could be a dangerous escalation is really attack on the consulate in damascus, a number

of iranians killed. for the first time attacking israeli soil from its soil and then israel also retaliating in the same fashion. i think and i will try to explain the view from tehran mo attack came on the heels of years of a shadow war and this was way before october 7 between iran and israel so they have been engaged in this shadow war mainly in syria across the region and they have been back and forth but not to that level. i think what happened as far as that attack on the consulate from tehran's viewpoint was seen as an escalation and brazen attack on a diplomatic facility. gary publicly they saw that on a different level and something worth responding to. the way they reported as

establishing deterrence, not necessarily escalating into something bigger. i think the response entailed from tehran's side was to show that they have the capacity to attack israeli soil and also the will. the assumption was that they they can, but they wouldn't. that they are not interested in an open war with israel which i think is true. actually i would argue one of the sides are interested in bringing that shadow war into the open direct confrontation. the third very important party here the united states is not interested in either direct confrontation with iran or iran and israel. so looking at that triangle, i think the iranians saw what escalation. they tried to respond but in a calculated way they had been telegraphing they were going to respond using back channels, letting the americans now.

all of that aim to that minimizing the impact or the casualties. and then the israeli response on iranian soil i think was also measured and calculated aimed at showing they are also willing to respond but not really taking this into the next level and the role of the u.s. with the biadministration making it clear that they would be in the defense so when iran attacks the u.s. helped israel but they wouldn't engage in an offense attacking iran, which is something that many analysts had been fearing. the netanyahu government pulling the united states into open war with iran. i think the biden administration drew that line very clear. and that triangle essentially turned into this not really escalating into next level both

sides establishing deterrence and new redlines. the redlines have been moving in blurring since october 7 across the region with the dynamic shifting. this brought iran and israel kind of to a new level but also back to where they saw they were as far as the shadow war. to your next question on weaponization, i don't think this episode has changed the thinking where the policy in tehran. we just saw that letter from the iranian mission in response to the e.u. letter yesterday emphasizing diplomacy, the fact that their nuclear program is peaceful, not interested in weaponizing. i think tehran once enjoyed being in this threshold state that kelsey explained in much better detail but not breaking

into an actual weapons program. having the option, using that as leverage. but i don't think the calculation is to weaponize, the policy hasn't been that for about two decades. so until he is alive, he is supreme leader and nothing really major has changed or shifted, even that episode with israel, some thought maybe that would be the final straw, but that didn't change. so unless something major happens like a u.s. attack on iran's nuclear program ironically may actually change that kind of decision-making. but i don't foresee anything major that would make them shift towards the weapons program but i think they enjoy pushing the

line and going even furt leverage. >> i'm going to lob a couple of questions that you. i think it's important for the people in the room the distinction between the ability to produce fissile material for nuclear weapons and weaponization. that is to say the actual ability to build a nuclear device that can explode when and where you want it to. iran is now a week from the ability to produce enough or for one bomb , what is publicly known about its weaponization efforts. to your knowledge is there anything to have changed the nie from 2006 which said the u.s. intelligence community believed iran had ceased weaponization efforts in 2003?

where are we on weaponization and how long might it take for iran to actually build a weapon if they wish to? >> it's a fairly quick question. i'm not sure i have a quick answer unfortunately. cye timeframe for produced fiscal material is relatively short. weaponization is much more difficult to gauge the time frames. many experts and myself address that waste on the work iran had to 2003 when they had an organized program but if tehran really wanted to, they could probably build a nuclear weapon in as little as six months. the congressional research service has quoted a u.s. official as saying a year, others say one to two years. but to a certainhat timeframe is less important when we are talking about risk because once iran has produced its fissile material, it is likely to divert that material

to covert locations, possibly multiple. for the weaponization process. so if the united states or israel is looking to disrupt a bomb, the best chance that they have is in the fiscal material production phase because they know where it is and ideally because of the existing monitoring, they would have some time to try to react if it was clear that iran was enriching to 90%. that's another reason why i think that the short time frames, the lack of monitoring is so concerning. i agree with the assessment that the supreme leader does feel bound by his fatwa and there hasn't been a decision in iran to develop nuclear weapons. current u.s. intelligence community assessments support that.

but the chance of miscalculating iran's intentions right now is i think higher than it ever has been in the history of the iranian nuclear issue. we now have senior officials in iran and former officials saying that iran's calculus might change. it might rethink the fatwa security change. combine that with a weak breakout and a misperception misinterpretation of an iranian development, and accidental spike in enrichment, all of these could put us on the path to conflict because we don't have the time to analyze the response because i do think the united states and israel are very serious when they say they will resort to force rather than allow iran to develop nuclear weapons. so even though the weaponization timeframe makes it sound like we have more time, my fear is that these windows have become so

small, the risk of miscalculation and the ability to use meaningful diplomacy if we fear breakout is quite compressed and that's why we need this diplomacy now. >> i would like to ask you both a question about what the ie knows and doesn't know. there have been no snap inspections for three years. that is to say those are the inspections where the iaea says we are going to an undeclared nuclear site and we want to see what's going on there. secondly, and i'm going to get a little wonky that i know those of you in the room will be pleased and not dismayed by this. if i understand it right, under so-called modified code 3.1 iran is obliged under a safeguards agreement to tell the iaea if it is building a nuclear facility. and if i understand the iranians

correctly, they said we are not doing that anymore and the iaea said you have to. given the absence of snap inspections and given this, does the iaea actually have the ability to figure out what it doesn't know or are we know and a world where iran is perfectly capable of building secret sites and potentially diverting some indeterminate number of centrifuge parts which i don't think the iaea knows how many>> do you wan>> sure, i will take a stab at it. the biggest hurdle in the nuclear weapons enterprise is the fissile material production. so that should give you a sense.

iran is enriching up to 60% and could go higher. so all this talk about how long does it take, the six month timeframe is used in the u.s. government or at least it was when i was there, that's kind of an assumption. once you get the fissile material, anybody should pretty much be able to do it. my guess is that it's much shorter for iran. i think you can rebar between the lines of -- read between the lines of iaea and understand that their challenge. and you have to ask the question these snap inspections or the ability to go anywhere anytime, which is never really anywhere any time, and there is a host of ways in which a country can delay things, obfuscate. the weather is bad today. the road is closed.

so many different ways they can do that. i don't see the modified iran's statement that it would not adhere to the early declaration of new facilities. to me that's a red herring. if they're going to have a secret facility, it's not like they are going to build it and then eventually tell the iaea. they are just going to do it. and the problem with uranium enrichment and specifically with centrifuge facilities is that there are very few signatures. but you can detect remotely. so it is always a good thing ground on-site inspections. it is always a good thing to be able to interview people. we found that out in iraq in the 1990's. you learn a lot of things by walking around.

and seeing how people react. so i agree. the less access, the restrictions on access, that degrades the iaea's capability but i think also in the popular press and popularly, people think of the international atomic energy agency as this watchdog. it's going to go out there and find things. the truth of the matter is much more that countries who are concerned help the iaea and a lot of that depends on levels of cooper, levels of cooperation even within the secretariat of the iaea. and all of that cooperation has dropped down significantly.

for a variety of reasons. i will leave it at that. >> kelce did so well on that, i'm going to pass over to you on this one. you talked about your review that the administration should seek a sort of de-escalate torres set of stats. you talked about dangling some carrots like the unfreezing of assets. two questions. one, do you think there is a plausible diplomatic path to a meaningful agreement that would rollback iran's nuclear program? and second why would iran ever trust the united states to adhere to a nuclear deal given

the experience that they just had of negotiating one with the obama administration and seeing that tossed aside a couple of years later by the trump administration? >> i certainly think there's a plausible path to immediate discoloration in the short -- de-escalation in the short term. i think just last year iran was willing to engage in moderating some of its more proliferation sensitive activities in exchange for the unfreezing of u.s. assets. the u.s. re-froze those assets after october 7. iran no longer felt bound by the voluntary actions that agreed to take. i think some of tehran's statements just around similar type of arrangement. in conversations between the atomic energy organization of iran and the iaea those officials have said they are

looking for sanctions really in exchange for additional transparency and monitoring. the iaea cannot put that on the table. united states can. i think it'd states tries to follow up on this perhaps opening that iran might be signaling once the new iranian president is elected. i don't think we're going to see anything until after that election in terms of diplomacy and space. would iran be interested in a broader deal that rolls back its program, i think that's a much more challenging question right now because iran is trying to leverage its threshold status for its security and national interests. will it be willing to give that up? i don't know, but i think we have to test that prospect because what the united states can put on the table in terms of economic benefits i still think would be attractive to iran

particularly if we can think about how to realize the sanctions lifting given some of iran's other stated goals. because of the advances i mentioned, i think rollback is challenging. this is going to have to be a much more focused monitoring arrangement, perhaps some unique elements that provide greater visibility and perhaps monitoring on some of the weaponization aspects of the program, but certainly i think there are enough indications coming from tehran that they are interested in agreement and we have to pursue something in the short term but also think about that new framework for the long-term. because the idea of iran staying on the threshold is just not sustainable. there's too much risk, the security -- there's too much risk of miscalculation. so really we need that

longer-term framework than it's worth investing time now into thinking what it's look like. >> why would the iranians trust the united states given the memories of 1953 are also quite fresh in the iranian minds? why would they engage in such an agreement? >> even the jcpoa the trump administration withdrawal surprised many of us in the u.s. and around, sidelined that idea of that camp in iran, the more moderate pro-diplomacy camp that there is a way that we can deliver, negotiate and get a deal. i don't think anything like that would be possible but i still think there is interest for diplomacy. it wouldn't look like something like jcpoa, something that encompassing and future looking.

the jcpoa had a lot of promises in terms of investment into the future. i think what iranians are more interested in or looking for is step by step, unfreezing of assets. something tangible that you can see, that you don't have to rely on for administrations after. i think the biden administration missed a very golden window of opportunity at the beginning of the administration about six months when they overlap with the previous iranian administration in tehran. that was really the time for the u.s., before ukraine before october 7. before the world got so crazy to either return to the jcpoa or reach out with serious meaningful diploma and unfortunately that didn't happen until about april and it hit the presidential election in iran. with the death of the iranian

president, there may be a new opening. we still have to wait and see. iranian elections are coming up soon. there are indications that there may be a slight shift to the center. not towards moderate or reformist by any means but a less hard-line president and a less hard-line minister could indicate -- whoever becomes u.s. president. we have these important elections coming up in iran and also in the u.s. that can show us a path forward. going back to what kelsey was saying jcpoa they say. in more different and creative format.

>> thank. if president trump is reelected. do you expect him to pursue a so-called maximum pressure policy toward iran? and is maximum pressure in an economic sense even conceivable in the world in which china seems quite happy to buy iranian oil, albeit not with its official state refineries. one of the unusual things about jcpoa was you had this consensus among the p5 plus one and the chinese did significantly reduce the purchases. do you see maximum pressure and is that even possible today? >> i think i learned my lesson during the first trump administration of the challenges of trying to predict what might happen. you can take this with a grain

of salt. i do think that we would see a second trump administration lean very hard into the maximum pressure focus with an attempt to get iran back to the negotiating table to get a deal better than the jcpoa. but as you said, maximum pressure today cannot what maximum pressure was during the first trump administration and it cannot be what the pressure campaign was in the lead up to the jcpoa in large part because of the geopolitical situation that we are in. one thing that is striking is that we have lost some of the core unity between the p5 on certain nonproliferation norms. it was not that long ago that we had cooperation at the security council on north korea. it was not that long ago that russia and china implemented sanctions on iran under the security council and engaged

very helpfully within the jcpoa context. so without that basis, i think it's going to be much more challenging to sustain pressure on iran. i could be disrupted even further if the european union or e3 france and the united kingdom go ahead with trying to impose u.n. nctions that were lifted under the j measure that would allow them to do that in a way that cannot be vetoed by russia and china. enacting this measure before it expires october 2025 is likely to deepen the rift between the left -- the west and russia and more importantly at the westin china because china has more influence on iran and china does

not want to see iran develop nuclear weapons, but they will not want to risk the snapback of u.n. measures, so i think the international disunity makes addressing the iran crisis more challenging, and i think we have to look for more novel ways to try toleast between the u.s. europe, and china in a way that can help support addressing the iranian crisis even if we do not directly reference iran. i think we are much more likely to garner beijing's support if we talk about nonproliferation norms were broadly, and if it is the u.s. that directs them as being applicable in the iranian case. so i think a maximum pressure will be on the table but i am not sure how maximum it will be. >> how do you think iran may respond to a trump maximum

pressure campaign such as it would be? do you think one would see additional -- you know, attacks by our iranian proxies like the attacks on the oil facilities in saudi arabia? do you think you will see our iranian nuclear acceleration or regional escalation? how do you think they would respond to it? >> i think more of what we saw under the trump administration -- let's not forget, donald trump is the person who pulled the united states out of the jcpoa and assassinated general stella many -- general soleimani. it creates a challenge for iran and the larger ally network they have, the axis of resistance to sit and negotiate and actually

make a deal with this person which is donald. so the makes it very difficult. it depends also who keep rings with himself to the white house. will it be mike pompeo and john boltons, or is it going to be a new breed of person? all of that i think matters, but assuming it willsame, maximum pressure 2.0, i agree with kelsey. i do not think it achieved what he was supposed to be achieved either in the form of a better making iran capitulate to the 10 point request of secretary pompeo. so i think it will be more of the same, so iran pushing the envelope as much as they can creating headaches here and there depending upon how the regional dynamic unfolds. the war in gaza is a very top

issue, how that will be by the time of the was election. will there be a cease-fire, whether we -- will there be escalation? that slows down i think all of these moving parts we have to look at and two becomes president in iran. is it someone more to the center of the hardliners? or is it someone like the big names? all of these will make a shift that will show again the path forward. >> i would like to pick up on something you said kelsey. someone spoke about the october 20, october 25 moment for britain and france to trigger

the snapback of u.s. sanctions that will expire. you may declared you do not think that is such a good idea. do you think it might prompt iran to withdraw from the mpt? >> yes. [laughter] i think iran has been consistent in messaging that snapback would prompted to take that step. now what i think we could see from iran is notifying of its intention to withdraw from the mpt, but usingw between notification and withdrawal to try to really leverage something from the united states and europe to get it to not follow through on withdrawal. so i think that is a long way of saying even if iran takes that step, wely going to develop nuclear weapons. certainly it would be concerning if iran did that, particularly

if they take out all iaea sectors and do not negotiate any new arrangement, but i think that is a real risk looking to october 2025 that the europeans will do this if there is no progress on the diplomatic front, which to me again underscores that we have to be iran with a much more urgency, with much more creativity, more flexibility and looking to partners like china that might have more influence to try and use those relationships to address this issue before we get to october 2025, because we should not test iran on whether or not it will withdraw in that scenario. >> lets pivot to saudi arabia for a moment. sharon what do you think we are likely to see in a u.s.-saudi nuclear cooperation deal? is there any possibility of

there being a separate 1-2-3 agreement that is not embedded in the other broader things i described at the beginning and all part of a package for israeli-saudi normalization? and the last question, don't the strategic folks always win out over the nonproliferation folks? i say that as a native washingtonian. it seems like the people who pursue strategic goals are usually able to be the people who pursue nonproliferation goals, however strategic those might be? >> let me answer that second question first, yes, which is why we need a deep guide on exactly how their strategic goals are faring. because i think historically you will see that it does not always quite worked out the way they wanted to. i thought you were going to ask me the question if iran pulls

out of the mpt will saudi arabia please. >> i don't know, but i like the fact that kelsey brought up or kind of implicitly suggested we should not panic immediately if iran leaves the mpt, because it would provide them with a lot of leverage. i think your idea is great. 123 agreement should not be embedded in any kind of bigger deal, but the real problem is that the congressional review of nuclear cooperation agreements -- that process is broken. it is broken for a lot of reasons, but let me tell you how it works now. the administration signs an agreement and presented in front of congress, and it will go through does it check the

requirements of section 123. invariably it says yes, and it goes through unless congress can enact a law against it. right? that is a huge hurdle. how it was supposed to work was that the administration was supposed to to and house committee on foreign affairs. the law all along in the process, and i will say there was a hearing on the hill several weeks ago, and there were very few questions answered by the administration on this deal. so, if somebody made me amber heard tomorrow -- made me emperor tomorrow, i would amend the atomic energy act to provide more oversight or to somehow tweak it so that it really is a

better review process. there is trend that has flown under the radar forever and that is that these agreements -- they have a certain duration, but then there is a clause that says rolling extension every five years, or in the case of taiwan and japan indefinite extension, so we are nuclear cooperation paners with japan and taiwan forever no matter what happens. ok, so the agreement itself says if the test nuclear the cooperation agreement is dead, but surely there must be other things short of testing a nuclear device that might cause us to reconsider. i have testified before congress a couple of times on this and made a bunch of recommendations really i think congress needs to think hard about the approval process. in general what they have done, and that means amending the

atomic energy act -- what they have done is country specific legislation. they did it on india. there is a bill on the hill right now with the saudi agreement. it is hard to pass a bill. i heard recently only 3% of bills ever get enacted into law. above all though, also at the nonproliferation assessment statement, which at the state department is required to do any classified and unclassified way. i think that congress needs to said specific requirements for those, because the ones that i have read at the unclassified level barely scratch the surface. this is -- i understand that there is a perspective in the u.s. government now that, though, we have to do nuclear trade with a lot of countries

because if we do not do with the russians were the chinese will, and our cooperation is better than theirs because we uphold nonproliferation standards. if that is the case, then we have to be very serious about those nonproliferation standards and i get the sense that in this rush to compete with russia and china that it is actually a rush to -- i forget what the phrase is. >> are rushed bottom. >> a rush to the bottom exactly. if you really think nuclear energy will make a difference for climate change and we need to build thousands of reactors this is a very serious issue that needs to get as much attention and money as the promotion of nuclear reactor exports does. >> i would like to ask you a

question we got online from chase winter. what leverage does the united states have with iran given the gaza war regional escalation, the upcoming change of supreme leader that could change iran's political calculus? what leverage does the u.s. have vis-a-vis iran? >> i think it is a lot, was the economic leverage. iran has been over sanctioned by consecutive administrations, so the u.s. has a lot of leverage in the form of sanctions. it can be long-term it could be in the form of oil sales, enforcement of sanctions freezing of assets. so i think what iran is looking

to the other side, and this is not just the u.s., but also europe is mostly in the form of that economic and if it were the leverage. jcpoa promise long-term more cooperation with this especially with europe, which is something the moderate camp in iran promised in the form of an investment, opening up trade and bilateral relations with europe. i think the hopes in iran are not that high. the u.s. has immense leverage in the form of economic incentives but the iranians have not either publicly or privately alluded to. >> we have another online question. do you think the iranians will choose ultimately to follow the bomb on the shelf approac for

the bomb in the basement approach? >> i am going to apply understand the bomb in the basement to be -- >> i don't know what the utility of having a secret promise, but anyway. >> there is some evidence to suggest that looking in some of the documents that israel stole from iran in 2018, the atomic archive as it is referred to that iran's plan for developing nuclear wea 2003 may have been to build a small number of nuclear devices but not draw attention to then or publicly say iran had deterrence unless it was necessary for security. would iran go down that route again? i think in general it would be very challenging for iran to develop an entire parallel

covert program to build nuclear weapons from start to finish without detection somewhere in the process. and i am not thinking as much year of the iaea on the ground -- that is important, but when you think of this surveillance and intelligence gathering that the united states, israel others do on iran, we are able to detect secret facilities in the past, and i think we would likely be able to do so again if they tried to go that complete covert pathway. my biggest concern is we would see a combination of the overt and if there was a decision to develop nuclear weapons, and what i mean by that is iran has this stockpile of near weapons grade material sitting at its declared facilities. if it moves that material and tries to enrich it at an illicit

site, would we be able to follow that? would we be able to take action against the facility if we were able to identify it? i may be more concerned about the bond that is between the basement and the shelf and that combination of pathways without ranking where the risk is, but i think for now absent a significant degradation of the security situation, whether that be an attack, and direct attack on iran by the united states or israel or significant degradation of iran's partners, iran will be content to stay in that threshold status unless it is induced by the united states to move back. so again, i probably sound like a broken record, but the urgency of diplomacy now is so critical that we do not have to defend against one on the shelf or in the basement. >> can i ask you a follow-up?

in a way you were talking about your fear of a bomb on a u-haul truck? do you think other intelligence agencies the track this, would you bet that they would be able to detect that? >> if it was just one, i would say it may be, yes, they would be able to detect that. nobody is worried about iran breaking out to build one bomb. one bomb does not provide them a deterrent. if they can break out to build fiber six, can we monitor five or six u-haul's? i do not want to be in a position to where we find out whether the united states or israel can actually do that, so diplomacy now so we do not have to test that capability. >> i would like to ask all of you a final question, which is to look at and night here in

scenario that is several steps ahead. that is iran does choose to build nuclear weapons. it builds multiple nuclear weapons. saudi arabia carries through with its intent to build nuclear weapons. you then see further proliferation in turkey and elsewhere. let's assume that we are all living in that world of multiple nuclear armed states in the middle east. how do you deal with that? is there any plausible way to deter those states from attacking each other, attacking the united states? how do you grapple with that ugly scenario? [laughter] >> ok, i can go first. i don't want to envision that in part because it makes me feel that i with a failed at my job

if we get there, but that aside again i think there is a difference between a willingness to possess nuclear weapons and an intention to use them, and if we have multiple nuclear armed states i think they will be focused on deterring each other. i imagine in that scenario the united states will still have significantly a larger nuclear arsenal that could be utilized with the partners and allies in the region that might be trying to respond to any attempt at nuclear coercion by iran, but if we do end up in that scenario it might also open the door for more creative regional solutions. and i think one thing we have to keep in mind when we think about nuclear diplomacy with iran is it is not going to be a panacea for all of the problems the united states has with iran and all the security dynamics when

the region -- dynamics within the region, so we have to be supporting the regional states and looking at their own security arrangements so that no state in the region ever gets to the point where it is going to think it needs nuclear weapons. i know, diplomacy again. thinking about nuclear diplomacy accompanied by support for regional security to prevent that reality is crucial. >> would either review like to take on that scenario? >> i commend kelsey for her diplomatic response. i will be less diplomatic. if you love the cold war, you are really going to love that proliferated world. it is a nightmare scenario for so many different reasons, and

you have to ask the question at one point -- at what point does the u.s. simply throw up its hands because with so many nuclear weapons states there, it gets very complicated. we were almost coddled by the -- and very lucky in our ability to deter nuclear war between the u.s. and soviet union and russia now so far, so that is a world i don't want to contemplate or live in, so let's avoid it. >> listen. >> it really is a nightmare scenario, i don't want to envision it. i don't think we're there yet and i don't think it would happen overnight. a lot of things would have to go wrong for the region to get

there, but i agree with sharon and kelsey. it is a nightmare, let's hope we do not get there, and let's use diplomacy. it is the only possible word and meaningful discussion. it has been the only successful solution that was tried and succeeded temporarily, and the other path is not brought any results, so let's try to focus and use diplomacy in this space as well. >> thank you all very much for the panel ended the session and i think we are going to have a brief coffee break, so thank you all. [applause] >> i want to thank everyone on this panel, your great moderation and meg for stepping

in at the 11th hour, and i also went to expressed a public thank you for kelsey davenport, whom i have had the pleasure to work with for over a decade who has been leading efforts on the iran nuclear file, and i wish things were in better shape but we will keep pressing forward. we will take a brief five minute break what we do a microphone switchover. do not go far, because we have got a great panel of on issues related to u.s.